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ABSTRACT.  The free-riding issue is generally considered to be the biggest obstacle in 
the success of an international environmental agreement.  Even without free-riding 
incentives, however, asymmetric information can pose a potentially significant threat in 
establishing a cooperative relationship.  In this study, we examine perfect Bayesian 
equilibria of a simple signaling game between a polluter country and a victim country 
over an agreement to mitigate unidirectional transboudary pollution.  We show that the 
stalemate in addressing an international environmental issue can be partly explained by 
the incentive conflict due to the asymmetric information on the environmental preference 
of a polluter. (JEL Q20, D82) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, the developed world has finally seemed to start paying greater attention to 
the status of their environment, having attained certain standards of living domestically.  
In the examples of the Kyoto protocol against global warming and the Montreal protocol 
against the ozone depletion, certain developed nations appear quite willing to devote 
more financial and technological resources to protecting the global environment.  In order 
to satisfy the basic economic needs of their citizens, on the other hand, developing nations 
still lean towards rapid economic growth, which sometimes leads to the dramatic 
environmental deterioration in many areas of the developing world.  Furthermore, there is 
an increasing number of transboundary pollution issues in which developing countries are 
going to play more significant roles as pollution sources.  Global warming, the ozone 
depletion and transboundary acid rain problems are just a few such examples. 
Among transboundary pollution, there are several instances of “unidirectional” 
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pollution simply due to their climatic and geographical conditions.  An example would be 
the transboundary acid rain problem from the U.K. to the Scandinavian countries where 
the westerly wind is predominant.  In addition, with the developed world making more 
serious efforts to improve the global as well as its own environment, increasing instances 
of transboundary pollution are assuming the virtual characteristic of unidirectional 
pollution originating from developing countries.  That is, even though physical conditions 
are reciprocal as in the case of the global atmosphere, a pollution issue can be treated 
essentially as unidirectional provided that some counties have contained its pollutant 
emissions quite significantly relative to the others.1  The regional acid rain problem 
between China and Japan could fall into this category.  In global pollution issues, such as 
global warming and the ozone depletion, the marginal abatement costs of the pollutants 
are considered to be significantly higher and getting even higher in developed countries 
than those in developing countries due to severe domestic restrictions on the pollutant 
emissions in the former nations.  From an economic perspective, accordingly, such global 
pollution may be approximated in a simpler framework of unidirectional pollution where 
all the economically-relevant abatement opportunities are available in developing nations.  
Hence, the importance of investigating a case of unidirectional pollution is not as limited 
as it appears.  In addition, whether it is physical or economic reasons that lead to a 
unidirectional pollutant flow, it often seems the case that a polluter nation is also suffering 
from its own pollutant emissions.  This observation would be quite appropriate in the 
examples of the acid rain problem in China and the effects of global warming in the 
developing world. 
As a general principle to solve international environmental conflicts, many nations 
have agreed to the so-called Polluter Pays Principle where a polluter should take full or, at 
least, partial responsibility for the environmental damages that it inflicted upon other 
nations.  Without a proper institution to enforce this principle, however, any international 
agreement has to be established on a voluntary basis.  Hence, economists have advocated 
the application of the Victim Pays Principle as a more successful and pragmatic approach 
to alleviate transboundary pollution under the current international circumstances (e.g., 
Baumol and Oates 1988; Missfeldt 1999).  In case of unidirectional pollution, this usually 
requires some compensation from a victim country for promoting pollution abatement 
efforts in a polluter country.  Given the fact that principal sources are recently shifting 
from wealthier developed countries to developing countries in an increasing number of 
transboundary pollution problems, a still prevalent economic disparity would render such 
                                                 
1 In contrast, the study by Kaitala and Pohjola (1995) portrays the global warming issue as a unidirectional 
problem where one country is vulnerable to global warming but the other is not. 
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a solution even more plausible. 
In reality, however, it is quite rare to observe a large-scale side payment from a victim 
in order to combat transboundry pollution.2  There have been several previous attempts to 
explain why we rarely observe such international transfer provision even in simple 
unidirectional pollution from one polluter to one victim.  One of them stems from the 
potential to weaken a victim’s reputation as a negotiator.  Mäler (1990) contends that, if a 
victim has to deal with two or more other countries on transboundary pollution issues, or 
to deal with the same country on several such issues, too great willingness to provide a 
side payment may give the country a reputation as a “weak” negotiator and increase the 
costs of other agreements.  Another possible explanation would be the existence of 
significant transaction cost that works against materializing any kind of international 
agreement.  Also, it has been pointed out that considering a transboundary environmental 
issue and other international relations at the same time could lead to a situation where a 
cooperative relationship can be more easily attained, even in the absence of a side 
payment.  The analysis of an “issue linkage” or an interconnected game has been 
conducted by Folmer, van Mouche and Ragland (1993) and Cesar and de Zeeuw (1995). 
The aim of this study is to present another possible explanation for the scarcity of 
cooperative relationships based on side payments in international environmental issues.  
Its main thesis is that the existence of asymmetric information between a victim and a 
polluter can be a source of difficulty in establishing such a relationship.  In environmental 
economics, several previous studies have tackled the problem of asymmetric information, 
mostly concerning the effectiveness of abatement technologies or the resulting abatement 
cost, by resorting to the “mechanism design” approach (e.g., Ellis 1992).  In contrast, this 
study investigates the information asymmetry about the environmental damage cost that a 
polluter incurs from its own emissions.  Even though physical environmental damages of 
a polluter may be observable to a victim, the polluter’s evaluation of its damages would 
be very difficult to infer from outside.  In the context of transboundary pollution, few 
previous studies have examined the issue of asymmetric information about damage cost.  
In fact, in a typical analysis of unidirectional pollution, the environmental damages of a 
polluter have usually been assumed away.  This might not be a realistic assumption as the 
acid rain is also a serious domestic environmental issue in China, for instance. 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In the next section, we describe our issue and 
also present our simplified framework as preliminaries for the following analysis.  In 
section III, we examine a signaling game where a polluter makes an announcement about 
                                                 
2 An exception for this statement would be the Montreal Protocol where developing countries were made 
concessions in order to go along with it (Missfeldt 1999). 
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its non-cooperative abatement level and a victim responds with its offer of a side payment 
as its effort to establish an international agreement, and demonstrate that there is a 
possibility that the polluter and the victim cannot agree upon a Pareto-superior agreement.  
In section IV, we discuss the results of our signaling game and consider several ways to 
extend our simple model.  The last section concludes this study with final remarks. 
 
II. ISSUE 
 
First of all, in order to focus on the issue with asymmetric information rather than the 
“free-ride” problem which could arise among multiple polluters or victims, we assume 
that there are only one polluter and one victim in this unidirectional pollution problem.  
Let e be the level of pollutant abatement effort made by the polluter.3  Its abatement cost 
function is assumed to be increasing and strictly convex in e.  In our unidirectional 
pollution, the emissions of the pollutant cause pollution not only in the victim country but 
also in the polluter country itself.  We suppose that the damage cost functions of the 
victim and the polluter are both decreasing and convex in e.  For simplicity, the number of 
possible types of the polluter’s damage cost is limited to two.  In an asymmetric 
information case, the victim does not know which of these two types is true, and they are 
distinguished only by their marginal damage costs. 
If there is complete information upon the type of the polluter, we can easily identify 
its truthful abatement level in the non-cooperative situation, where the polluter takes only 
its own cost into account, as the level that minimizes the sum of its abatement and damage 
cost.  Such an abatement level can be implicitly given by the usual marginal condition4, 
which is 
)()( eMDCeMAC ip= ,         [1] 
where MAC(e) is the marginal abatement cost function, and MDCpi(e) (the superscript i 
signifies its type and i = L or H) is the negative of the marginal damage cost function of 
the polluter.5 
On the contrary, the abatement level in the cooperative case, where the damage cost of 
the victim is added to the consideration, is given by 
                                                 
3 In our framework, we suppose that the pollutant emissions in a victim country are completely contained 
for domestic reasons. 
4 Given the assumptions on the curvatures of the abatement and damage cost functions, the first-order 
conditions [1] and [2] are not only necessary but also sufficient for cost-minimization. 
5 Precisely speaking, the latter signifies the value of environmental damages avoided by one additional 
abatement effort. 
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)()()( eMDCeMDCeMAC v
i
p += ,        [2] 
where MDCv(e) is the negative of the marginal damage cost of the victim.  This is simply 
a variation of the “Samuelson condition” for the provision of a public good.  When there 
is not too significant a difference between MDCpL(e) and MDCpH(e) relative to the size of 
MDCv(e), we can depict these marginal cost curves as in Figure 1 for instance.6  Given the 
marginal conditions above, the four abatement levels, eNL, eNH, eCL and eCH, in Figure 1 
are respectively the non-cooperative abatement levels and the internationally optimal or 
cooperative abatement levels for the two different types of the polluter. 
Although the cooperative abatement level certainly increases the total welfare over 
the non-cooperative level, there is currently no world government to force the polluter to 
take into account the damage cost of the victim as well as its own.  In order to realize the 
cooperative abatement level in essentially a non-cooperative international setting, 
therefore, the victim needs to provide a sufficient amount of side payment.  Such a side 
payment has to leave the polluter, now saddled with the higher abatement assignment, at 
least as well off as its non-cooperative welfare.  Using Figure 1, we can see that the 
“minimal” amounts of side payment required for attaining the cooperative abatement 
levels are the area (C+E+F) and the area (B+C+D), for the high and low cost types of the 
polluter, respectively.  With such compensation amounts, each type of the polluter 
becomes indifferent between the non-cooperative and the cooperative abatement levels, 
and all the gain from the cooperation accrues to the victim. 
However, if there is asymmetric information on the type of the polluter, by behaving 
strategically a certain type of the polluter may be able to gain a strictly positive profit after 
receiving a side payment in an international agreement.  In our setting, the high damage 
cost type polluter may improve its welfare by pretending itself as the low type.  Let us see 
how this is possible.  If there is no international agreement, the high damage polluter 
definitely loses by pretending as the low type and choosing eNL, instead of choosing its 
truthful non-cooperative abatement level, eNH.  Unless a side payment is provided, the 
area (A) in Figure 1 signifies the amount of its welfare loss by pretending as the low cost 
type.  However, the victim needs to pay at least the area (B+C+D) in order to induce the 
low damage polluter to attain the cooperative abatement level of eCL, which actually 
requires the high damage polluter to bear the extra cost of only the area (C) over its 
reduced damage cost.  Therefore, the high damage type polluter that succeeds in 
                                                 
6 If there is a very wide difference between these two curves relative to the size of the marginal damage cost 
of the victim, the MDCpH curve might locate above the MDCpL+MDCv curve for any abatement level.  In the 
following analysis, however, this case is precluded by the assumptions on the relevant parameter values. 
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convincing the victim that he is the low damage type could gain the area (B+D) even if the 
international agreement is implemented with the minimal side payment. 
In the face of such a potential strategic action, the victim may try to implement a 
counter-measure to mitigate loss arisen from this behavior.  To an economic problem with 
a hidden characteristic, the idea of the “revelation principle” has been widely applied 
(Fudenberg and Tiorle 1991).  In our unidirectional pollution context, this principle 
essentially implies that a victim can come up with a certain menu of various contracts, 
each of which is intended for a particular type of the polluter, and that allowing the 
polluter to voluntarily choose his favorite contract will, in fact, result in the revelation of 
its true type and the highest possible welfare for the victim, even though some 
information rent will usually accrue to the polluter, depending on its actual type.  In each 
contract, the amount of side payment from the victim and the polluter’s abatement level in 
the agreement is clearly specified.  Then, a contract is immediately agreed by the two 
parties to implement, which does not explain the observed infrequency of international 
agreements with side payments.  In our signaling model the offer of this sort of 
two-dimensional contract is not allowed.  In particular, the abatement level in a potential 
international agreement is determined exogenously, possibly by an outside agency or by a 
separate negotiation between the two countries, in such a manner that the polluter’s 
choice of its non-cooperative abatement level must be honored.  More precisely, we 
assume that the targeted level of abatement is selected to be an internationally optimal 
level, based on the polluter’s non-cooperative abatement choice. 
Henceforth, without the loss of generality, we restrict our attentions to a very tractable 
case of a quadratic abatement function for a polluter and linear damage cost functions for 
the two countries.  We suppose that the possible types of the polluter’s damage cost are 
limited to two types as above, and, moreover, that the difference between these two types 
is entirely represented by the difference in the slopes of these damage cost functions.  
Using the similar notations, the damage cost function of the polluter, DCpi(e), is defined 
as 
).()( eeeDC upi
i
p −= θ          [3] 
Here, θi is either θL or θH, depending upon its types, and epu is the abatement level above 
which the pollutant emissions become completely harmless for the polluter.  The actual 
value of the parameter, θi, is privately known to the polluter, but the victim merely has an 
ex ante subjective probability distribution regarding the type of the damage cost function 
of the polluter.  This “prior belief” is defined such that the victim originally expects to 
face the low damage type and the high damage type with the probability of p (0 < p < 1) 
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and 1-p, respectively.  We assume that this belief is common knowledge between the two 
parties for the sake of the analysis in the next section. 
On the other hand, the damage cost function of the victim, DCv(e), is expressed as 
).()( eedeDC uvv −=          [4] 
Similarly to epu above, evu is the polluter’s abatement level above which the pollutant 
emissions are harmless for the victim.7  The parameter d is just a constant and known by 
both countries.  Finally, the abatement cost function of the polluter, AC(e), is expressed as 
2
2
1)( ceeAC = ,          [5] 
where c is a known constant.  With these simply specified set of functions, Figure 1 can be 
rewritten as Figure 2.  Then, the non-cooperative abatement level of the polluter in the 
absence of a side payment can be easily derived from [1], [3], and [5] as eiN = θi/c for i = 
L or H.  On the other hand, the cooperative abatement level can be derived from [2], [3], 
[4], and [5] as eiC = (θi+d)/c for i = L or H. 
 
III. SIGNALING GAME AND ITS EQUILIBRIA 
 
In this section, we model our problem as a simple signaling game and examine its 
perfect Bayesian equilibria.8  The game tree in Figure 3 depicts the strategic interactions 
that take place between the polluter and the victim.  As is well known in the game theory 
literature, a game of incomplete information can be transformed with the introduction of 
the initial move by “Nature” to a game of imperfect information (Harsanyi 1967).  An 
important restriction of this transformation in our context is that the victim’s prior belief 
on the polluter’s damage cost must be common knowledge.  With this transformation, 
Nature moves initially to determine the type of the polluter’s domestic damage cost.  
Knowing the result of this Nature’s move, the polluter at the node PL0 or PH0 makes a 
committed announcement regarding the non-cooperative level of abatement.  Here, we 
assume that this announcement is committed in the sense that the polluter has to 
implement the chosen non-cooperative abatement level without any assistance in case 
that the agreement is not eventually reached.9  We will discuss the alteration of this 
                                                 
7 We suppose that the level of abatement efforts will not reach epu or evu under any circumstance.  Then, due 
to the linear specification of the damage cost function, these values are actually unimportant in our analysis. 
8 For the definition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and other game-theoretic concepts in this section, see 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
9  Equivalently, the announcement can be made concerning its own damage cost as long as its 
non-cooperative abatement level of the polluter is based on this announcement when an agreement 
eventually fails. 
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assumption in the next section. 
After this action of the polluter, the cooperative abatement level in the international 
agreement is determined so as to maximize the global gain from the agreement according 
to the announced non-cooperative abatement level by the polluter.  That is, the 
internationally optimal level of abatement is selected as the abatement level in a potential 
agreement.  In our simple game, this decision is made exogenously.  Then, the victim 
chooses the amount of side payment, s, which will be offered to the polluter in exchange 
for attaining the cooperative abatement level.  Finally, the polluter chooses either to 
accept this offer of a side payment or to reject it.  In case of the acceptance, the two 
countries engage in the international agreement which implies the implementation of the 
internationally optimal abatement level by the polluter and the provision of the side 
payment by the victim.  In case of the rejection, the polluter implements its announced 
non-cooperative abatement level without any assistance from the victim. 
The respective payoffs for the two countries in Figure 3 are obtained by calculating 
the corresponding areas in Figure 2.  The left and right entries in each parenthesis are the 
payoffs of the polluter and the victim, respectively.  We suppose that the payoff for 
conducting its own non-cooperative abatement level is simply zero for each type of the 
polluter.  On the other hand, we evaluate the victim’s payoffs by supposing that its welfare 
level at eLN is standardized to zero.10  Let us further denote θH-θL by θ for the sake of 
notational convenience. 
The game tree in Figure 3 is depicted in a slightly abbreviated way in order to focus 
on the interactions after the choice of eL by the polluter.  In our setup, the choice of eH 
essentially reveals that the polluter is the high cost type because the low cost type would 
never choose eH.  The low cost type polluter always acts honestly at the node PL0 because 
the low cost type polluter can secure itself the payoff of zero by choosing eL while it 
would lose θ(θ+2d)/2c by being required to abate up to eHC with the amount of side 
payment that leaves the high cost type polluter just break-even, which is represented by 
the area (k+n+o).  This low cost type polluter’s payoff is obtained by calculating the 
negative of the area (f+l+t), which is the area (k+n+o) minus the area (f+k+l+n+o+t) in 
Figure 2.  Suppose that the high cost type polluter acts honestly at the node PH0, it also 
receives the area (k+n+o) from the victim and just breaks even.  However, the high cost 
type has an incentive to lie and state eL at the node PH0 because of the possibility that it is 
treated as the low cost type and required to abate only up to eLC with the side payment that 
yields the polluter a strictly positive payoff of the area (f+l), which is given by subtracting 
                                                 
10 These assumptions on payoffs do not lead to any loss of generality because only the relative magnitude of 
each payoff matters to the choice of an action by each player. 
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the area (k) from the area (f+k+l). 
In fact, merely by the considerations of the belief at the information set V, it is clear 
that under any circumstances we cannot have a “separating” equilibrium where both 
types of the polluter act honestly at their initial nodes.  Let us suppose that, when the 
information set V is reached, the victim believes that the polluter is the low cost type with 
the probability r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1) and it is the high cost type with the probability 1-r.  If they are 
behaving honestly at the initial nodes, the consistency requirement of the victim’s 
posterior belief specifies r = 1.  Then, the victim will offer the side payment that leaves 
the low cost type just break-even.  However, such an amount of side payment will induce 
the high cost type to switch its strategy and choose eLN, thus annihilating the possibility of 
this separating equilibrium. 
In fact, depending upon the victim’s prior belief concerning the polluter’s type, the 
game yields two different kinds of perfect Bayesian equilibria.  When p is rather large, the 
game has a “pooling” equilibrium where the two types of the polluter choose the same 
action, eLN, at the initial nodes.  In this equilibrium, an international agreement is always 
implemented on a relatively small scale.  On the other hand, when p is sufficiently small, 
we have a “hybrid” or “semi-separating” equilibrium.  In such an equilibrium, the high 
cost type polluter is playing a mixed strategy at the node PH0.  Especially, it randomizes 
between eHN and eLN, and eLN is the action always taken by the other type at the node PL0.  
Moreover, in this equilibrium it is possible that there is no international agreement 
reached.  Let us see how we can obtain these results. 
The action by the polluter at the end of the game is straightforward.  Each type of the 
polluter accepts a side payment from the victim and engages in an agreement only if its 
payoff from the acceptance is greater than its payoff from the rejection.  For the low cost 
type polluter, this implies that it ought to accept s if s-d2/2c ≥ 0, that is, s ≥ d2/2c, and 
reject s otherwise.  The high cost type polluter would rather accept s if s-(d-θ)2/2c ≥ -θ2/2c, 
which can be transformed to s ≥ (d2-2θd)/2c, and reject s otherwise.  In this study, we 
suppose d ≥ 2θ.  That is, the damage cost of the victim is at least twice as large as the 
difference in the damage costs of the two types of the polluter.  When this is not the case, 
there is a possibility that a negative amount of side payment is offered by the victim and 
accepted by the high cost type polluter in the equilibrium.  This is a consequence of our 
assumption that the initial action of the polluter cannot be reversed after an agreement 
eventually fails. 
Given this strategy of the polluter at the last nodes and its belief over the types of the 
polluter, the victim determines the amount of side payment.  The belief is characterized 
by the value of r, and the objective of the victim is to maximize its expected payoff.  Let 
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Pr(s) be the probability that the offer of s is accepted by the polluter.  According to the 
polluter’s response toward s at its last nodes, there are three possible values for Pr(s); 
Pr(s) = 1 when s ≥ d2/2c, Pr(s) = 1-r when d2/2c > s ≥ (d2-2θd)/2c, and Pr(s) = 0 when s < 
(d2-2θd)/2c.  Then, the victim’s problem is expressed as 
)Pr(
2
ss
c
dMax
s 


 − .      [6] 
The payoff function to the victim is depicted in Figure 4, specifically when it is willing to 
use a mixed strategy.  In order for the victim to employ a mixed strategy, the expected 
payoff from offering s = d2/2c must be equal to the expected payoff from offering s = 
(d2-2θd)/2c.  Thus, a mixed strategy is employed by the victim only when 
c
d
c
d
c
dd
c
dr
22
2)1(
2222
−=


 −−− θ .     [7] 
By solving [7] for r, we obtain r = 2θ/(d+2θ).  As we will see below, this particular value 
of r turns out to be an important threshold and we denote it by r*.  If the victim believes 
that there is more chance of the polluter’s being the low cost type than r*, it offers s = 
d2/2c.  On the contrary, when it believes that the polluter is less likely to be the low cost 
type than r*, the victim offers s = (d2-2θd)/2c.  Then, Only when r = r* = 2θ/(d+2θ), the 
victim employs a mixed strategy.  Let us suppose that, as its mixed strategy, the victim 
chooses s = d2/2c with the probability w (0 < w < 1) and s = (d2-2θd)/2c with the 
probability 1-w, respectively. 
Now, we consider the action taken by the high cost type polluter at the node PH0.  
When it chooses eHN, the international agreement aimed at eHC will be implemented with 
the side payment which makes the high cost type polluter just break-even because the 
victim is certain that no low cost type polluter had chosen eHN at the node PH0.  
Consequently, the high cost type polluter obtains zero by choosing eHN.  Then, the 
expected payoff from choosing eLN must also be zero for the high cost type polluter to 
randomize at PH0.  In such a hybrid equilibrium, therefore, the following equation has to 
be satisfied: 
0
2
)(
2
2)1(
2
)(
2
2222
=


 −−−−+


 −−
c
d
c
ddw
c
d
c
dw θθθ .   [8] 
Solving [8] for w, we obtain w = θ/2d.11  Hence, for a mixed strategy to be the equilibrium 
strategy for the high cost type polluter, we need w = θ/2d as the victim’s mixed strategy. 
Finally, we must specify the belief of the victim when the information set V is reached.  
This posterior belief has to be determined by the Bayes’ rule, given the victim’s prior 
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belief and the equilibrium strategy of the polluter.  Let us suppose that the probability 
with which the high cost type polluter chooses eLN at the node PH0 is u (0 < u < 1).12  As 
we have seen above, in order for the victim to employ its mixed strategy, we must have r 
= 2θ/(d+2θ).  Hence, by the Bayes’ rule, the following equation must be satisfied: 
upp
p
d )1(2
2
−+=+ θ
θ .      [9] 
Solving [9] for u, we obtain u = dp/2θ(1-p).  While the constraint 0 < u can be trivially 
satisfied, the constraint u < 1 provides a condition for obtaining the hybrid equilibrium.  
That is, we have the hybrid equilibrium only if u = dp/2θ(1-p) <1, which yields the 
condition upon p as p < 2θ/(d+2θ). 
In summary, depending on the prior belief of the victim concerning the polluter’s type, 
we have two different kinds of perfect Bayesian equilbriua for our particular signaling 
game.  The first is the pooling equilibrium where both the low cost and high cost types of 
the polluter choose eLN as their non-cooperative abatement level.  This equilibrium 
realizes if p ≥ 2θ/(d+2θ) as in Figure 5.  In this pooling equilibrium, the victim does not 
update its posterior belief.  The polluter’s initial move is followed by the offer of s = d2/2c 
by the victim and this offer will be accepted by the polluter.  Hence, in this equilibrium, 
there is always an international agreement on a relatively small scale.  The other possible 
equilibrium is the hybrid equilibrium which occurs when p < 2θ/(d+2θ).  In this 
equilibrium, the high cost type polluter employs the mixed strategy as its local strategy at 
its initial move, randomizing between eLN and eHN with the probabilities u = dp/2θ(1-p) 
and 1-u, respectively.  At the information set V, the victim’s posterior belief is r* = 
2θ/(d+2θ) on the left node and 1- r* on the right node, and it offers s = d2/2c with the 
probability w = θ/2d, and s = (d2-2θd)/2c with the probability 1-w.  The polluter accepts 
this offer only when its payoff from the acceptance is greater than its payoff when it 
rejects the offer, that is, s ≥ d2/2c for the low cost type and s ≥ (d2-2θd)/2c for the high cost 
type, and otherwise it rejects the offer, implying that an international agreement can fail in 
the latter case. 
 
IV. DISCUSSIONS 
 
The most interesting result obtained in the previous section is that there is a possibility 
that an international agreement is not reached successfully despite the fact that it 
represents a Pareto improving change.  In the hybrid equilibrium, an agreement fails with 
                                                                                                                                               
11 If u = 1, we have a pooling equilibrium. 
12 Note that, because we assumed d ≥ 2θ, it is always the case that 0 < w = θ/2d < 1. 
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the probability r*(1-w) = {θ(2d-θ)}/{d(d+2θ)}, because the low cost type polluter rejects 
the offer of s = (d2-2θd)/2c from the victim.  Let us define q = r*(1-w).  Interestingly, the 
value of q does not depend on the level of the victim’s prior belief concerning the 
polluter’s type.  This is because, no matter what the victim’s prior belief might be, the 
value of r has to equal r* = 2θ/(d+2θ) for a mixed strategy to become the equilibrium 
strategy for the victim, which is  required for the realization of the hybrid equilibrium.  On 
the other hand, the victim’s prior belief is critical in determining whether the hybrid 
equilibrium actually emerges.  As long as p is sufficiently small, which means that the 
polluter is believed sufficiently likely to be the high cost type, we have a non-zero 
probability that a mutually beneficial international agreement is rejected by the polluter. 
Furthermore, we can easily derive ∂r*/∂d = -2θ /(d+2θ)2 < 0, which implies that, the 
more concerned the victim is about its own environmental damages, the less likely we 
have the hybrid equilibrium given an exogenous probability distribution over the types of 
the polluter.  We can also obtain ∂q/∂d = 2θ{d(θ-d)+θ2}/{d(d+2θ)}2, where q is the 
probability that an international agreement fails in the hybrid equilibrium.  Then, a 
straightforward calculation shows that ∂q/∂d < 0 always holds for d ≥ 2θ, which we have 
assumed above.  This result implies that the likelihood of an eventual disagreement goes 
down with the increase in d.  Both ∂r*/∂d < 0, and ∂q/∂d < 0 indicate that an international 
agreement is more likely to be reached if the victim cares about its own environmental 
damages more significantly.  These results are somewhat intuitive in that, the more 
important this environmental issue is to the victim, the more strongly it would seek an 
international agreement even if it might allow the high cost type polluter to pretend as the 
low cost type. 
On the other hand, we can derive ∂r*/∂θ = 2d/(d+2θ)2 > 0, which implies that, the 
greater the difference between the two polluter’s types is, the more likely the hybrid 
equilibrium realizes.13  Therefore, as the value of θ increases, we are more likely to 
observe the hybrid equilibrium although whether we have the hybrid equilibrium or the 
pooling equilibrium also depends on the actual value of p.  Moreover, we can derive 
∂q/∂θ = 2d{d2-θ(d+θ)}/{d(d+2θ)}2.  Then, it follows that ∂q/∂θ  > 0 for d ≥ 2θ.  Hence, 
the likelihood of the actual failure of the international agreement in the hybrid 
equilibrium goes up with the increase in θ.  As opposed to the change in d, both ∂r*/∂θ > 0 
and ∂q/∂θ  > 0 indicate that the two countries have more difficulty in reaching an 
agreement when the difference between the two types of the polluter is relatively large.  
These results imply the fact that the high cost type polluter finds it more difficult to 
successfully disguise itself as the low cost type in such a case. 
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The structure of the signaling game above is admittedly very simple.  We can easily 
think of several ways to extend the model.  First, we can consider more than two types of 
the polluter in terms of its damage cost with different probability distributions over its 
types as a prior belief of the victim.  This extension will certainly complicate the model 
but would not change the basics of strategic interactions between the polluter and the 
victim over a resulting form of an international agreement.  That is, as long as certain 
types of the polluter have interest in misrepresenting themselves and the victim loses by 
such a disguise, the victim may attempt to “play hard” by offering a relatively small 
amount of side payment as a measure to discipline such a polluter and not to yield to the 
polluter’s disguise too easily. 
The second possible extension would be to include a repeated bargaining process over 
the amount of side payment.  Recently, there have been many important works on 
bargaining with asymmetric information, and they provide us with several insights into 
such a bargaining.  In a bargaining situation, we usually introduce discount factors which 
measure the impatience of negotiating parties and make it more attractive for them to 
reach an agreement sooner than later.  In a bargaining game where only an uninformed 
party makes proposals and there are continuous types of the receiver, a “screening” 
equilibrium typically emerges.  In such an equilibrium, the uninformed player screens the 
other player’s private information through time via the sequence of offers (Kennan and 
Wilson 1993).  In our context, the victim starts offering a relatively small amount of side 
payment which can be accepted only by a polluter with sufficiently high domestic 
damage cost, and, every time the polluter rejects its previous offer, the victim will 
gradually increase its offer amount for the purpose of screening the polluter’s type. 
Additionally, our setting is an example of a so-called “gap case” because the total 
welfare gain from an agreement is always strictly greater than the cost to implement it, 
irrespective of the polluter’s type.  As Muthoo (1999) demonstrates for a general gap case 
with infinite opportunities of making proposals, the two parties will always agree on a 
mutually beneficial trade in some finite time.  That is, there is no possibility that the 
players disagree and fail to reach an agreement indefinitely.  In our specific context, if the 
victim possesses the infinite opportunities of proposing side payments, the polluter will 
accepts the offer sooner or later.  However, the delay in reaching an agreement still 
represents an overall efficiency loss. 
We have also assumed above that the polluter needs to commit to its initially 
announced non-cooperative abatement level in the sense that it has to implement this 
level of abatement when an agreement eventually fails.  However, if the costs of reneging 
                                                                                                                                               
13 It is always the case that r* < 1/2 since we have assumed d ≥ 2θ. 
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on its initial announcement, such as the cost of losing international reputation, are 
relatively insignificant, the polluter has an incentive to avoid its own welfare loss that 
arises from actually implementing too small a non-cooperative abatement level.  If the 
polluter’s renouncement is completely costless, we only observe the pooling equilibrium 
where the polluter always chooses eLN at the node PH0.  The high cost type polluter will 
never do worse by claiming eLN than by acting honestly because it is guaranteed the 
payoff of zero by choosing eLN in this case.  Therefore, the belief of the victim at the 
information set V simply coincides with its prior belief.  A similar calculation to the 
previous section shows that, if p ≥ (2θd-θ2)/(d2+2θd-θ2), the victim offers s = d2/2c, and if 
p < (2θd-θ2)/(d2+2θd-θ2), it offers s = (d-θ)2/2c.  Although this outcome is qualitatively 
different from the one above, there is still a possibility that an international agreement 
fails when p < (2θd-θ2)/(d2+2θd-θ2) because the low cost type polluter surely rejects the 
offer of s = (d-θ)2/2c. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The stalemate in addressing an international environmental issue can potentially be 
explained by the incentive conflict arisen from the asymmetric information on the 
environmental preference of a polluter.  Without the information on its damage cost, a 
victim or any international agency cannot judge exactly what would be the internationally 
optimal level of abatement and the appropriate amount of side payment.  In this study, we 
examined a signaling game between a polluter country and a victim country over an 
agreement to mitigate unidirectional transboudary pollution.  In our simple analytical 
setting, we have seen that the existence of asymmetric information can prohibit the 
realization of a Pareto-superior international agreement.  Specifically, such a situation is 
likely to occur when the uncertainty over the polluter’s damage cost is sufficiently 
significant compared to the size of the victim’s damage cost. 
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